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TWAIL AND THE DABHOL ARBITRATION
Gus VAN HARTEN*

The article draws on the theoretical perspective of Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) in order to review a case study in international
investment arbitration.From the arbitrationproceedings in the InternationalChamber
of Commerce, which arose from controversies regarding the Dabhol project in India,
three inferences are drawn. First, it demonstrates how investment contract arbitrators
may approach their role as going beyond the usualremit of commercial arbitration that
is rooted in an autonomous agreement between the contractingparties. In this case, the

arbitration was recast as a mechanism fr wide-ranging review of government policies
and judicial pronouncements associated with Third World interests. Second, the
arbitration offers reasons to suspect regime bias, as discussed in the TWAIL literature,
based on the institutional make-up of the tribunal and the content of its final award.
Third, the arbitration formed part of a wider conflict between Western and Third
World interests that implicated courts and tribunals in the U.S., the U.K., and India.
With reipect to TWAIL itself it is suggested that the perspective provides a useful
reference for organliing a critique. However, it is less relevant for the identifcation of
specic options fr reform in international arbitration or strategies to encourage,
manage, or regulate investment for social ends. In this respect, TWAIL might benefit
fom the incoporation of more applied and technical stud) alongside its guiding
priniplesand frameworkfJr critique.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The article draws on the theoretical perspective of Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) in reviewing and analysing a case study in international
investment arbitration.' The subject of the case study is an International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) arbitration that arose from controversies surrounding the
Dabhol project in India. 2 The Dabhol project was a power generation project
launched by the Enron Corporation in the 1990s in the State of Maharashtra. As it
progressed, the project engaged various actors, including U.S. firms, U.S.
governmental agencies, and governments - as well as non-state actors, social
movements, and other constituencies - in India. Disputes arising from the project
led to proceedings in various courts and tribunals in different jurisdictions,
including the ICC Arbitration located in New York.
Drawing on TWAIL, three points are made in this article about the ICC
Arbitration. The first is that the case demonstrates how international investment
1 The 1WAIL perspective is approached on its own terms, that is, it is used as a basis
for review and not subjected to close scrutiny for its claims and assumptions. The author
acknowledges that this may be regarded as a sojourn into a complex area of theory and
seeks the indulgence of specialists to allow an outside perspective on TWAIL and its
relevance to the field of international investment arbitration.
The author is grateful to the editors of Trade, Law and Development for their invitation to
contribute to this Speial Issue on Third World Approaches to International Law and
acknowledges the helpful comments of an anonymous peer reviewer as well as the Board
of Editors. All errors or omissions are my own.
2 The primary source of information about this arbitration is the text of the tribunal's
award. See Capital India Power Mauritius I and Energy Enterprises (-Mauritius) Company v.
Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited, Maharashtra State Electricity
Board, and the State of Maharashtra, Int'l Comm. Arb. Case No. 12913/MS (27 April
2005), available at: http://italaw.uvic.ca/documents/Dabhol award_050305.pdf (last
visited Ju1y 15, 2011) (hereinafter ICC Arbitration).
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arbitrators - in this case, acting under a contract 3 - may approach their role as
going beyond the usual remit of a commercial arbitration, which is rooted in an
autonomous agreement between the contracting parties. In the present case, the
arbitration was recast by the arbitrators as a mechanism for wide-ranging review of
government policies and court decisions that are associated with Third World
interests. The second point, as described by Gathii,4 is that the ICC Arbitration
provides reasons to suspect regime bias, in international arbitration based on the
institutional make-up of the tribunal and the content of its award. The third point
is that the ICC Arbitration constituted part of a wider conflict between Western
and Third World interests that implicated courts and tribunals in the U.S., the
U.K., and India before it was resolved in 2005 by an agreement involving U.S.
firms, the U.S. government, and various Indian governments.5
In conclusion, a brief comment is offered on TWAIL in light of the discussion
of the case study. It is suggested that TWAIL provides a useful reference for
organizing critique of international arbitration. However, TWAIL appears less
relevant, beyond its role as a source of general norms, for the identification of
options for reform in international arbitration or for strategies to encourage,
manage, or regulate investment for social ends. In this respect, TWAIL might
benefit from the incorporation of a more applied and technical analysis alongside
its guiding principles and framework for critique.
The article is preliminary, in that it does not provide a thorough study of
theory and instead examines a single case study. The aim is to offer tentative
insights on aspects of TWAIL and the case study, each informed by a review of the
other, and not to evaluate wider aspects of the Dabhol project or international
arbitration. The methodology comprises a review of academic literature on
TWAIL, of secondary sources on the Dabhol project, 6 and of the ICC Arbitration
International investment arbitration here refers to any compulsory arbitration
between a foreign investor and a host state or state enfity, whether authorized by a
contract, domestic statute, or treaty. The present case involves a contract-based
international investment arbitration (or investment contract arbitration) in that it arose
from an arbitration clause in an agreement between foreign investors and a state entity.
Gus VTAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, Ch. 3 (Oxford
University Press 2007).
4 James Thuo Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance
(hereinafter Gathii), in INT1'FRN\I IONALi L \w AND Tim
i Tilii
WoiRLD: RFsiIP\11NG
JusI'Cb (Richard Falk, Jacqueline Stevens, & Balakrishnan Rajagopal eds., Routledge 2008)
(hereinafter Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal eds.).
I Ronald J. Bettauer, India and InternationalArbitration: The Dabhol Experience, 41 Gb 0.
WVASH. INT'L L. REV. 381, 383-385 (2010) (hereinafter Bettauer).
6 Information on the Dabhol project was collected from secondar literature including
U.S. law journal articles as well as the Indian publication Economic & PoliticalWeekly.
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award itself. The primary basis for evaluation of the case study was the text of the
award issued in April 2005 by the ICC Arbitration tribunal, which was established
under one of the legal agreements underlying the Dabhol project.7 Notably, this is
one of an apparently small number of ICC arbitration awards, and the only award
in an investment arbitration against India, that is publicly available, to this author's
knowledge.8
II. A SUMtARY OF THE TWAIL APPROACH
Authors identifying with TWAIL tend to offer a critical, pluralist, and
reformist perspective on international law and international institutions. The
unifying theme is the acceptance that international law disadvantages countries that
were subjected to colonialism and benefits narrow elites who are especially based
in the West.' The approach has in-built tensions since it distinguishes groups of
countries based on their historical encounters with international law via
colonialism, but seeks to account for differences among countries (and other
actors"') included in the category of "Third World". Likewise, the TWAIL
approach is "fundamentally oppositional" to international law and international
institutions," but aspires to a program aimed at eradicating social ills. 12 In these

7 See ICC Arbitration, supranote 2.
1 The award was available from the Investment Treaty Arbitration website, supra note
2. This website is an open access repository for awards in investment treaty arbitration and
has also posted awards in investment arbitrations under contracts and domestic legislation.
As of 29 April 2011, there were four ICC arbitration cases that had at least one award
available on the website. The ICC reported an average of 69 arbitrations per year involving
a state or state entity during 2005-2009. International Chamber of Commerce, ICC
InternationalCourt ofArbitration Bulletin, Vol. 16-21. The ICC publishes selected extracts from
awards in some cases, but does not make public the full award in any ICC case.
9 Richard Falk, Jacqueline Stevens & Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Introduction, in Falk,
Stevens & Rajagopal eds., supra note 4, at 5-6 (hereinafter Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal Introduction) ("international law has too often been the province of the strong, and
unfriendly to practices associated with the rule of law and justice"); Vijayashri Sripati, The
United N ation's Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Processes: TWAIL Insights, 10 INT'L
COMMUNITY L. REV. 411, 416 (2008) (TVAIL "assails the creation and perpetuation of
international law as a 'racialized hierarchy' of international norms and institutions that
subordinate the third world by the first world").
"o See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, What may the Third World" Expectfrom InternationalLaw?, in
Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal eds., supra note 4, at 17 (invoking "resilient normative
expectations" exemplified by the women's rights, anti-torture, human rights and forgotten
peoples, social and economic rights, and sustainable development movement).
11 fakau fatua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM,.SOC'Y INT'] L. PiRoc. 31 (2000) (hereinafter
Matua).
12Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic InternationalLaw: Rethinking Human Rights
and Development as a Third World Strategy, in Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal eds., supra note 4, at 64
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respects, TWAIL confronts tensions between universality and pluralism, rejection
and reform, and the use of law to advance elite interests and its use to respond to
social problems such as poverty, racism, and corruption.
Matua identified three objectives of TWAIL. These were, in brief, the critical
assessment of international law, the construction of alternative norms, and the
eradication of conditions of underdevelopment. 3 He framed the Western
orientation to the Third World in terms of the metaphor of savages-victim-saviour,
focusing especially on the human rights movement. 14 This reflects the wider
scepticism in TWAIL of concepts of human rights and good governance. 5 It also
reflects the view that international law, at times, denigrates Third World actors as
backward "others" in comparison to a rational and coherent Western mindset.' 6
The TWAIL approach was explored in a collection of papers published in the
Third World Quarterlyin 2006.1 The collection reflects diverse perspective on topics
ranging from the colonial history of international law,' 8 to refugee law and
torture,19 to international water law and policy.20 For present purposes, besides the
importance of colonialism to international law,21 two main points are drawn from
this collection. The first is that the Third World is a varied and evolving concept
(hereinafter Rajagopal) (referring to the need in TWAIL to reconsider past tactics and goals
in order to imagine "a co-existence of counter-hegemonic international law alongside
hegemonic international law"); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Poverty, Agenc' and Resistance in the
Future ofInternationalLaw,in Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal eds., supranote 4, at 98.
13 See iMatua, supra note 11, at 31.
14 Makau Matua, Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 H \l\.
INT'L L.J. 201 (2001).
'5 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of InternationalLaw: Colonial and PostcolonialRealities, in
Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal eds., supra note 4, at 45 (hereinafter Anghie) ("Human rights law
was controversial, however, precisely because it legitimized the intrusion of international
law in the internal affairs of a state"; "The virtues of good governance are apparently self
evident. But the meaning of the terms remains open and contestable and these institutions
[the IMF and the World Bank] attempted to use an amended version of human rights law
to further their neoliberal policies in the guise of 'good governance', rather than enabling
real empowerment of Third World citizens."); Rajagopal, supra note 12, at 64-66.
16
See Anghie, supra note 15, at 42; Ikechi Igbeoji, The Civilised Seff and the BarbaricOther:
Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Securiy, in Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal
eds., supra note 4, at 152-153; Matua, supra note 11, at 33.
1 27(5) Ti 111U WoiRLD Q. (2006).
18 Anghie, supra note 15.
19 Wadie E. Said, PoiticalAsylum and Torture: A ComparativeAnalysis, in Falk, Stevens &
Rajagopal eds., supra note 4.
20 Hilal Elver, InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, Water and the Future, in Falk, Stevens &
Rajagopal eds., supra note 4 (hereinafter Elver).
21 Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal - Introduction, supranote 9, at 3.
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due to divergences among countries and the inclusion of non-state actors within
the concept of Third World interests. 22 Also, the concept is varied and evolving
because it includes concerns about the threats posed to Third World interests, not
only by Western states, but also by major firms in important industries or areas of
policy, such as water. 23 Linked to this is the second point - that the notion of the
Third World once offered a coherent basis for political alternatives, such as in the
case of the Non-Aligned Movement or the G-77.24 Today, in the absence of
similarly active groupings, TWAIL literature combines lamentation for past defeats
with calls for new reforms which support Third World interests. 2 5
An important source for the present study is an article by Gathii in the above
collection. 26 In the article, Gathii elaborates on the concept of regime bias as an
aspect of TWAIL. The concept is compared to the approaches of National
Economic Control (exemplified by the Calvo doctrine) and New International
Economic Order (exemplified by General Assembly Resolutions, particularly the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States). 27 In contrast to these other
approaches - which provide external critiques of, or alternatives to, international
rules - the idea of regime bias examines the internal processes by which
international law is interpreted and applied in decisions affecting the Third World.
Thus, it envisions some in-built bias in the processes of international
administration and adjudication.28 According to Gathii:
[B]ias is traced in the way in which rules of international trade,
commerce and investment are crafted, applied and adjudicated
between Third World and developed countries or between Third
World countries and the interests of international capital. Regime
bias therefore refers to examining the choices made between
alternative ways of crafting legal rules, the meanings ascribed to a
particular rule whether in its application by an administrative
agency, or at the adjudication stage by a domestic judicial body, or
an international tribunal. 29
22

Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal - Introduction, supra note 9, at 3-4; Rajagopal, supra note 12,

at 63.
Elver, supra note 20, at 190-192 (reporting that two French water companies held
nearly 40% of the existing water market share, providing water related services for over 110
million people each).
24 Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal - Introduction, supra note 9, at 2; Rajagopal, supra note 12,
at 63 (reporting that Third World coalitions like the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77,
and others have lost almost all geopolifical relevance).
25 Rajagopal, supra note 12, at 77.
26 Gathii, supranote 4.
27 Id. at 255-9.
28 Id. at 264.
29 Id. at 261-262.
23
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This regime bias approach in TWAIL is used below in the review of the
structure, process and reasons for the award in the ICC Arbitration. More broadly,
from these sources on TWAIL, the following elements may be distilled:
*

*
*
*

International law is not a neutral and objective set of rules but an instrument
employed in the context of power relations among Western and Third World
states as well as other actors;
International law reflects an underlying bias against countries that were
colonized and that remain "others" in international society;
International institutions may interpret and apply international law in ways that
are systemically biased against Third World interests; and
An important aim of international legal scholarship is to go beyond criticism
of international institutions by elaborating ways to reform international law
and eradicate social ills.

The remainder of this article draws on these elements, explicitly or implicitly,
to review the Dabhol case. In particular, the ICC Arbitration is examined for its
engagement with Third World interests (assuming, based on TWAIL, that India
qualifies as a Third World state), its possible reflection of regime bias, and its
relationship to apparent conflicts between Western and Third World interests. In
the conclusion, TWAIL is revisited in a brief discussion on the perspective
contributed to this study and how it might be oriented toward a more specific
program of reform.
III.

O\ERVIEW OF THE DABHOL PROJECT

The Dabhol project was a major power project involving the construction of
natural gas-fired electricity plants, 250 km south of Mumbai in Maharashtra,
India.3 o The project was expected to cost U.S. $2.8 billion.31 It was established
following an effort by the Government of India to liberalize and privatize the
energy sector, by encouraging foreign investment. 32 The project was to be the
For more detailed histories, see Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation:Corporate
at:
available
(1999),
Violations
Rights
Human
in
Complicity
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/enron/ (last visited July 15, 2011) (hereinafter
Human Rights Watch); Preeti Kundra, Looking Beyond the DabholDebacle: Examining its Causes
and Understanding its Lessons, 41V ANI. J. TRANSNAT'l. L.907, 912-923 (2008) (hereinafter
Kundra); Kirit S. Parikh, Thinking through the Enron Issue, 36(17) ECON. & POL. WKi N. 1463
(28 April 2001) (hereinafter Parikh); Tony Allison, Enron's Eght-Year Power Struggle in India,
Asli TINiS ONIINF (18 January 2001) (hereinafter Allison).
31Parikh, supranote 30 at 1463.
32 Id. For an account of the case for this reform of India's energy sector by a U.S. legal
academic who is also an international arbitrator, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating
3o
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largest foreign investment project in the country and was billed as the largest
privately-owned electricity generation plant in the world.33 It was one of several
major energy projects approved by the Indian government in the 1990s.34
The Dabhol project was highly controversial in India. It was criticized by
academics, trade unions, opposition political parties, non-governmental
organizations, and the media on a range of grounds.35 Criticisms related to the
process that led to the project, the substance of the deal, as well as the social and
environmental impact of the investment activities. In terms of its process, the
project was criticized for its unusual speed and lack of transparency. The
Memorandum of Understanding for the project, concluded between Enron and
the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB), was signed only three days after
Enron's first visit to India to review possible locations for the project and its quick
decision to set up the project at Dabhol.36 Furthermore, Enron's proposal did not
undergo a standard competitive bidding process in India.3 7 When the terms of the
deal were disclosed, the project was condemned on the grounds that it was secured
and sustained by corruption.38 Critics pointed to the testimony of an Enron official
before a U.S. Congressional Committee in 1995, wherein it was reported that
Enron had spent $20 million on educational gifts for the project - this was
39
identified by commentators as a possible source of bribes.
The deal was also criticized on substance. Under the terms of the Power
Purchase Agreement between the Dabhol Power Corporation (DPC - owned by
Enron, Bechtel, and General Electric) and the MSEB, the MSEB agreed to buy
90% of the power generated by the project regardless of market demand for
InternationalProject Agreements, 24 FoRDHANM INT'L L.J. 1319, 1344-1346 (2000) (hereinafter
Salacuse).
33 Human Rights Watch, supranote 30, at Part I; ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 17.
34 Seven other power projects were established in India around the same time as the
Dabhol project. Private power project scrapped, 25(4) TilI ECOiLOGIST 1 (uly-August 1995)
(hereinafterPrivatepower project strapped); So Many Dabhols, 30(33) ECON. & POi .WKILY. 2023
(19 August 1995) (hereinafter So Many' Dabhol).
35 Human Rights Watch, supranote 30, at Parts I & III.
36 See Parikh, supra note 30, at 1463.
3 Id.
38So Many Dabhols, supra note 34, at 2024 ("The rent element in these deals as in the
agreements for the 'fast track' power projects is so blatant that corruption and bribery are
to be expected, indeed to be taken for granted.... [T]he ultimate blame must rest on the
architects of the current economic policies which have elevated foreign investment and
privatisation to the status of national goals with the result that today no deal is so
outrageous that it cannot be justified on those grounds and pushed through.").
3 Kundra, supra note 30, at 932, citing Allison, supra note 30; Subodh Wagle, TNCs as
Aid Agencies? Enron and the DabholPowerPlant, 26(4) THE ECOLOGIST 179, 180 (1996).
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electricity and at a cost well above that of other available energy sources.40 The
tariff was denominated in U.S. dollars such that the MSEB would bear the
currency risk over the project's lifetime. For its fuel supply, the project depended
on imports of liquid natural gas (LNG) from Qatar, where Enron had entered into
a joint venture to develop LNG.41 The Government of Maharashtra guaranteed
the MSEB's liabilities under the deal, and the Government of India counterguaranteed the Maharashtra Government's guarantee. 42 In contrast to the MSEB's
liabilities, it was argued that Enron's commitments to performance targets were
subject only to modest penalties or even rewards for performance failures.43 In one
detailed economic analysis of the deal, it was found that performance guarantees
and related penalties undertaken by the DPC did not constitute a substantial
burden on the DPC; that the DPC's profitability (estimated to be a real, post-tax,
internal rate of return of 28%) was very high when compared to that prescribed by
Indian government consultants (17 to 21%); and that the project would be viable
for the MSEB only if the MSEB's average tariff increased at a rate of more than
14.5% per year over a 20-year period.44 In these respects, the deal was considered
highly unfavourable by Indian commentators from the perspectives of the national
energy policy, consumers, taxpayers, and other local interests that would bear the
costs of the project.45 Notably, in 1993, the World Bank declined to finance the
Dabhol project on the basis that it was not economically viable following a World
Bank review in 1992 that characterized the deal as one-sided in favour of Enron. 46
Once the project was under-way, public opposition intensified as its social and
environmental impacts became apparent. Public protests, by affected communities
took place, against land acquisitions, and encroachments on fishing and water
access. 47 According to a report in the Ecologist, the project threatened the livelihood
40 P. Purkayastha, Enron: The Drama Continues, 30(33) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2042
(August 19, 1995) (hereinafter Purkayastha); Kundra, supra note 30, at 918.
41 Salacuse, supra note 32, at 1347.
42 Kannan Srinivasan, Indian Law and the Enron Agreement 30(20) ECON. & POiL. WKI.Y.
1153, 1153 (May 20, 1995) (hereinafter Srinivasan).
4 Girish Sant, Shantanu Dixit & Subodh Wagle, Dabhol Pro/ect PPA - Structure and
Techno-Economic Implications, 30(24) ECON. & Pol. WKI N. 1449, 1455 (une 17, 1995)
(hereinafter Sant, Dixit & Wagle).
44 Id. at 1455.
45 For a review of the economics of the project, see Sant, Dixit & Wagle, id; Lessons from
Dabhol(Editorial), 36(5/6) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 427 (February 3-10, 2001).
46 Human Rights Watch, supra note 30, at Part 1I, citing, among other World Bank
sources, a letter from Joeile Chassard, World Bank Senior Financial Analyst, Energy
Operations Division, India Country Department to U.K. Mukhophadhyay, Maharashtra
State Secretary for Energy and Environment (July 8, 1992). See also Deeptha Mathavan,
From Dabhol to Ratnagiri: The Electricity Act of 2003 and Reform of India's Power Sector, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387, 403 (2008) (hereinafter Mathavan).
47 Human Rights Watch, supranote 30, at Part III.
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of about 10,000 people, mainly fishers and farmers.48 Authorities in India engaged
in violent repression of this opposition, and Enron and the U.S. government were
complicit in human rights violations associated with the project, according to a
report by Human Rights Watch in 1999.49 Among the conclusions of this report
were the following:
.... examining the state's response to opposition to the Dabhol
Power Corporation, Human Rights Watch believes that the state
government of Maharashtra has engaged in a systematic pattern of
suppression of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly
coupled with arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force, and
threats....
In addition to the state, Human Rights Watch believes that the
Dabhol Power Corporation and its parent company Enron are
complicit in these human rights violations. Enron's local entity, the
Dabhol Power Corporation, benefited directly from an official
policy of suppressing dissent through misuse of the law,
harassment of anti-Enron protest leaders and prominent
environmental activists, and police practices ranging from arbitrary
to brutal. The company did not speak out about human rights
violations and, when questioned about them, chose to dismiss
them altogether.
But the Dabhol Power Corporation's responsibility, and by
extension, that of the consortium and principally Enron, goes
beyond a failure to speak out about human rights violations by the
state police. The company, under provisions of law, paid the
abusive state forces for the security they provided to the
company....

In

addition, contractors

(for DPC) engaged in

a

pattern of harassment, intimidation, and attacks on individuals
opposed to the Dabhol Power project.... When these activities
were brought to the company's attention, the Dabhol Power
Corporation refused to acknowledge that its contractors were
responsible for criminal acts and did not adequately investigate,
condemn, or cease relationships with these individuals.
.... Human Rights Watch considers that the financiers of Phase I of
the project's construction (1992-99) and U.S. government agencies
that financed and lobbied for the project are complicit in the
48 Privatepoerproject scrapped, supra note

49 Human Rights Watch, supranote 30.

34.
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human rights violations. In particular, the U.S. government bears
special responsibility because of its aggressive lobbying on behalf
of the three U.S.-based companies developing the project and
because it extended hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds
for the project while seemingly indifferent to human rights-related
conditionalities that apply to such transactions. 5
Public opposition to the Dabhol project was a major factor in the Maharashtra
state elections in 1995, which led to the election of a coalition government of two
parties (Bharatiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena) that were committed to cancelling
the project.51 After the election, the government established a high-level Cabinet
Committee to review the project.52 The Committee's report confirmed concerns
that the delivered cost of power from the project would impose heavy losses on
the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB), that the MSEB's commitment to
purchase 90% of the energy produced by the project would require it to back
down cheaper generation plants which it itself owned, and that the dependence on
LNG to fuel the project would be a major drain on India's balance of payments.53
Based on the report's recommendations, the Government of Maharashtra took
steps to cancel the project.54
In response, Enron initiated arbitration in London under the dispute
settlement clause of the Power Purchase Agreement between the Dabhol Power
Corporation (DPC) and the MSEB,ss while the Indian entities pursued action in
domestic courts in India. 56 The U.S. government reportedly objected strongly to
so Id. at Summary and Recommendations.
1 Id., at Part II.
52 Parikh argues that the delay caused by the decision to review the project - rather
than to cancel it outright after the election - enabled Enron to inflate its costs and liabilities
in anticipation of litigation from $100 million to $300 million. Parikh, supra note 30, at 2042
("Enron has spent this entire period of review in bringing in its equity early and awarding
contracts to a large number of contractors with an eye to filing large cancellation claims.").
3 Purkayastha, supra note 40. This report followed an earlier one, also critical of the
terms of the project, by India's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy (May 29,
1995), excerpted in Human Rights Watch, supra note 30, at Appendix C.
54 See Kundra, supranote 30, at 917.
55 The arbitration clause in the Dabhol Power Purchase Agreement provided for the
resolution of disputes via arbitration in London under the UNCITRAL Rules, with default
appointment powers allocated to the president of the Electricity Supply Industry
Arbitration Association of England and Wales. The arbitration clause is reproduced in
Srinivasan, supra note 42, at 1153.
16 Parikh, supra note 30, at 1463. This litigation in Indian courts was itself characterized
by some U.S. commentators and by the ICC Arbitration tribunal, supra note 2, at 27-31, as
a violation of the DPC Shareholders Agreement and other sources of law. However, the
discussion was more at the level of policy debate than legal analysis. See, e.g., Bettauer, supra
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the project's cancellation and claimed that it would have negative consequences for
foreign investment in India.5 The litigation ended when Enron and the
Maharashtra Government agreed in 1995 to renegotiate the deal. The renegotiation
led to modest changes in the size, tariffs, payment terms, environmental
monitoring, and ownership of the project.58 However, opposition to the project
continued in India with renewed claims of corruption.59
By 2000, the first phase of the project had been in operation for about 18
months and a second was expected to come online the following year.®o However,
at this stage, energy demand was below the forecasts underlying the project and the
cost of power from the project was very high. 61 The Maharashtra Government
announced a further review of the project, which concluded that the MSEB was
"financially incapable of meeting its payment obligation" and proposed a further
renegotiation to de-peg the tariffs from the U.S. dollar, restructure the fuel supply
arrangements, and increase financial support to the MSEB from the state and
national governments. 62 A few months later, the Maharashtra Government alleging breach of the Power Purchase Agreement by the DPC - ceased its
payments to the DPC, and the Indian Government declined to make payments
under its counter-guarantee, citing the contractual dispute. 63
At this point, the dispute became, as Godbole put it, "a happy hunting ground
for legal luminaries representing parties to the dispute". 64 International arbitrations
were initiated against governments in India under investment contracts linked to
the project, under treaties between India and countries in which corporate
note 5. Notably, Bettauer's sources for the factual background on the Dabhol project were
limited to an article in a U.S. journal, the American Arbitration Association (AA) and ICC
Arbitration awards issued in the U.S., a memorandum filed by the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation in the AAA arbitration, and the U.S. government's Request for
Arbitration against India arising from the OPIC pay-out, Bettauer, supra note 5, at 382
(note 7). They did not include any Indian sources.
7 Salacuse, supra note 32, at 1352. For a reaction from one Indian source to the claims
of U.S. officials, see So Many Dabhols, supra note 34, at 2023 ("Take, for instance, the US
energy secretary who on lobbying visits to this country earlier this year had read us the riot
act and told us in no uncertain terms that cancellation of the Enron project would
jeopardize all the private power projects being proposed for international financing...").
58 Parikh, supranote 30, at 1463; Salacuse, supranote 32, at 1352-1356.
59 Human Rights Watch, supranote 30, at Part II.
60 Parikh, supranote 30, at 1463.
61 Kundra, supra note 30, at 919.
62 Id., where these findings of the Godbole Committee report of April 10, 2001 are
reproduced.
63 Kundra, supra note 30, at 919-922.
64 Madhav Godbole, Resolving Dabhol Tangle, 39(23) ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2329, 2329
(June 5, 2004) (hereinafter Godbole).
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subsidiaries of Enron and other U.S. firms were located, and state-to-state dispute
settlement processes relating to the insurance role of the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC). First, the dispute under the Power Purchase
Agreement was referred by the DPC to arbitration in London (and by the MSEB
to Indian courts). 6 5 Second, Bechtel, as a co-owner of the DPC, referred a claim
under the DPC Shareholders Agreement to the ICC Arbitration in New York. 66
Third, claims for about $1.3 billion in compensation were reportedly launched by
Bechtel and General Electric under India's bilateral investment treaties with
Mauritius and the Netherlands. 67 Fourth, in a state-to-state arbitration, the U.S.
government brought a claim against India after OPIC, in an American Arbitration
Association proceeding in the U.S., was required to pay about $110 million to
Enron, Bechtel, General Electric, and Bank of America in risk insurance for the
Dabhol project.61
Of these four arbitrations, only the ICC Arbitration led to a known and
publicly available award. This is partly because, in 2005, an overall settlement was
reached between the U.S. and Indian governments, as well as the U.S. firms, which
terminated outstanding arbitrations and court actions. 69 The terms of the
settlement do not appear to be public." By this point, Enron, the main protagonist
among the major firms involved in the project, had been dismantled in bankruptcy
proceedings and its stake in the project was sold to Bechtel and General Electric.n
Also, in India, the energy sector had been reformed in 2003, partly in response to
Dabhol, in order to diversify the electricity supply, strengthen competitive bidding,
See Kundra, supranote 30, at 922-923.
See ICC Arbitration, supranote 2.
67 John J. Kerr & Janet Whittaker, Dabhol Dipute - Legal questions remain unresoved, 1
CONSTRUCTION L. INT'L 17(2006) (hereinafter Kerr & Whittaker). See also, Bettauer, supra
note 5, at 382 (note 7) & 385, which refers (mistakenly, it appears) to the ICC Arbitration,
supra note 2, as an award under the India-Mauritius bilateral investment treaty.
68 Bechtel Enterprises International Ltd. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
No. 50 T195 00509 02 (2003), available at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
2294171_1.pdf (last visited July 15, 2011); John R. Crook (ed.), U.S. Initiates Arbitration
against India over OPIC Claimsfor the DabholPower Project, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 271 (2005).
69 See Bettauer, supra note 5, at 384-385.
7 The overall settlement is reported in Kundra, supra note 30, at 930; Bettauer, supra
note 5, at 386-387; Kenneth Hanson, Robert O'Sullivan & W. Geoffrey Anderson, The
Dabho/ Power Pro/ect Settlement What Happened?And How?, at 3-4 (December 2005), available
http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/a5aale52-4285-4bb5-87e6at:
7201123895a0/Presentafion/PublicationAttachment/352f8f09-ae96-40fc-a293720d0b8f0ca8/Dabhol InfrastructureJoumall2_2005.pdf
(last
visited
July
15,
2011) (hereinafter Hanson, O'Sullivan & Anderson).
n See Mathavan, supra note 46, at 390. Enron Corporation declared bankruptcy in late
2001.
61
66
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and establish an appeal process from decisions of state energy regulators.72 As
discussed in the next section of this article, the ICC Arbitration provides a window
on these larger disputes and controversies stemming from the Dabhol project.
IV. OUTLINE OF THE ICC ARBITRATION IN THE DABHOL CASE
One of the legal proceedings that arose from the Dabhol project was the ICC
Arbitration initiated by Bechtel under the DPC Shareholders Agreement.7 An
outline of this arbitration is provided in this section, based primarily on a review of
the tribunal's award. However, the arbitration is only one part of the Dabhol
dispute, and the award is only one source of information on the role of
international arbitration in this case. The arbitration is examined closely here
because it appears to have generated the only award which is publicly available in
relation to Dabhol,74 and in any international investment arbitration against India.
Yet the discussion is focused on a single primary source which remains, out of
necessity, a stand-alone example.
The ICC Arbitration was based on a contract, the Dabhol Power Corporation
Shareholders Agreement, between the owners of the Dabhol project.76 More
broadly, the Dabhol project was based on agreements between the foreign
investors - led by Enron, but including Bechtel and General Electric and various
subsidiaries - and governments or state entities in India. Of these agreements, the
key contract was a 20-year Power Purchase Agreement between the Dabhol Power
Corporation (established by Enron, Bechtel, and General Electric at the outset of
the project) and the MSEB.77 These agreements established a governing structure
for the project that involved corporate decision-making processes and the
regulatory roles of the MSEB, the Maharashtra Government, and the Government
of India. The project also involved other governmental actors, such as the U.S. ExIm bank (reportedly as a source of financing for the project) and OPIC (as a risk
insurance provider).71 Finally, disputes arising from the Dabhol project were
72

Id. at 396-403.

7

ICC Arbitration award, supra note 2.

74 The UNCITRAL arbitration award appears not to be public. The OPIC award is

public, supra note 68, but was conducted between a U.S. firm and OPIC and not under an
investment contract or treaty. Other arbitrations arising from the Dabhol project have been
reported but are not known to have led to an award; supra note 67.
In general, it is difficult to research contract-based investment arbitrations because
of the confidentiality of investment contracts and the relevant arbitrations. In some
instances, an award may be released by a party that has access to it, as in the case of the
present ICC Arbitration; supranote 2.
76 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 1-4.
n Sant, Dixit & Wagle, supra note 43.
7 Dabhol: SuiidalFirstStep, 29(1/2) ECON. & POL. WKLJY, 23 Jan. 1-8, 1994).
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subjected to adjudication before courts in India as well as international tribunals
whose authority was derived from the various contracts and, it appears, from
bilateral investment treaties concluded by India.79
As indicated, the ICC Arbitration did not take place under the Power Purchase
Agreement, which was the main contract for the Dabhol project. Rather, it was
initiated under the Shareholders Agreement which established the DPC as the
immediate owner of the project. In turn, the DPC was originally owned, through
subsidiaries, by Enron (80% equity), Bechtel (10%), and General Electric (10%).So
As of 1996, however, as part of the renegotiation of the project, an Indian
company (the Maharashtra Power Development Corporation - MPDC) became a
party to the Shareholders Agreement after acquiring a minority share in the DPC.81
The MPDC was reportedly controlled by the MSEB and the Maharashtra State
Government.8 2 Thus, by 1996, the parties to the Shareholders Agreement included
three Mauritius-based subsidiaries of Enron, Bechtel, and General Electric,
respectively, and the MPDC. Based on this agreement, Bechtel83 initiated the ICC
Arbitration against the MPDC and named the MSEB and the Maharashtra
Government as additional parties, even though they were not signatories of the
84
Shareholders Agreement.
The ICC Arbitration tribunal consisted of three arbitrators.85 The proceedings
were held, and situated as a matter of law, in New York.8 6 The arbitration was
conducted under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (CC) and
8
under the auspices of the ICC's International Court of Arbitration based in Paris.
88
Only the claimant, Bechtel, actively took part in the arbitration. The Indian
Supra note 67.
S See Kundra, supranote 30, at 914-915.
8 Id. (reporting that the MSEB acquired a 30% equity share of the DPC in 1996,
reduced to 15% in 2000. It is assumed for present purposes that the MSEB owned this
equity share via the \IPDC).
82 See ICC Arbitration , supra note 2, at 3-4.
83 See ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 2. Although subsidiaries of Bechtel and General
Electric were parties to the ICC Arbitration, only the Bechtel subsidiary took part fully in
the arbitration such that its rights and obligations were determined in the award.
84 See ICC Arbitration , supra note 2, at 3-4. Thus, three entities were sued by Bechtel.
The first was the IPDC, which reportedly held shares in the DPC on behalf of the MSEB
and which was a party to the Shareholders Agreement. The second and third were the
MSEB and the -Maharashtra government, which were not parties to the Shareholders
Agreement but were sued based on links to the MPDC.
85 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2.
86 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 39.
87 Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (revised 1 January
1998) (hereinafter ICC Rules of Arbitration).
88ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 2-3.
79
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respondents did not participate other than to object that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction and that decisions by courts in India precluded their participation in
the arbitration as a matter of domestic law. 0 Thus, the tribunal faced a situation in
which only the lawyers and experts acting on behalf of the claimant were present
during the proceedings, leaving it to the tribunal to work out how to account for
the interests of other parties.
The tribunal's award is 39-pages in length. The tribunal began the award by
introducing the parties to the dispute, 90 highlighting provisions of the Shareholders
Agreement, and reporting Bechtel's claims against the MPDC. 91 In summary, as
indicated in the award, Bechtel claimed that the MPDC breached the Shareholders
Agreement by refusing to support Bechtel's nominees to the Board of Directors of
the DPC (presumably after most of the board members resigned following
Enron's bankruptcy), by interfering with the rights and interests of the DPC, and
by initiating proceedings in Indian courts to stay the ICC Arbitration. 92 On this
basis, Bechtel sought about $160 million in compensation, that was said to include
the value of its total investment in the project as well as legal and arbitration
costs.93
After highlighting Bechtel's claims, the tribunal provided a short history of the
proceedings including the basis on which the tribunal was constituted. 94 The
tribunal then explained briefly (in about 4 pages) why it rejected the Indian parties'
jurisdictional objections that (1) the policy decisions of the Maharashtra
Government with respect to the project were outside the scope of the arbitration
clause in the Shareholders Agreement and (2) the MSEB and the Maharashtra
Government were not parties to the Shareholders Agreement and thus had not
consented to the arbitration.95 Having dismissed these objections, the tribunal
turned to the merits of the case9 6 by outlining various agreements, beyond the
Shareholders Agreement, that related to the project and by highlighting the overall
role of the MSEB, the Maharashtra Government, and the Government of India in
the project. 97 The tribunal also touched upon the 1995-1998 period in which the
Maharashtra Government began to oppose the project, before turning to events

89

Id. at 16-17.

90 Id. at 2-4.

Id. at 4-10.
Id. at 8-9 & 28.
9 Id. at 9-10. Bechtel also sought injunctions against the Respondent's participation in
court proceedings in India.
94 Id. at 10-15.
95 Id. at 16-19.
96 Id. at 19-31.
97 Id. at 19-25.
91
92
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that led directly to the ICC Arbitration.98
After this discussion, which appeared to set the stage for the tribunal's reasons
on the merits of Bechtel's claims, the tribunal turned abruptly to its conclusions.
And with virtually no further discussion, the tribunal found in favour of Bechtel
on all issues, including issues not otherwise identified in the award.9 9 Thus, in less
than 2 pages, the tribunal simply declared that the MPDC violated the
Shareholders Agreement, that the MSEB and the Maharashtra Government were
"affiliates" of MPDC, and that these affiliates were jointly and severally liable for
damages owed by the MPDC. 1 " Further, the tribunal concluded that the overall
conduct of the Indian parties violated not only the Shareholders Agreement but
also other agreements related to the project.11 Next, although it had until this
point not identified any specific claims by Bechtel on these issues, the tribunal
found that the "coordinated course of conduct" by the Indian parties was "in
violation of... the applicable standards of international law requiring recognition of
written agreements to submit to international arbitration and forbidding
uncompensated expropriation of Claimant's property".102 Finally, the tribunal
added portentous conclusions that the Indian parties' overall conduct "operated as
a total expropriation of the Claimant's investment in the Project, and resulted in
depriving the Claimant of its fundamental rights in the Project and the entire
benefit of its investment therein".103
Having reached these conclusions on the merits in favour of Bechtel, the
tribunal provided more elaborate reasons for its decision on damages. Ultimately, it
awarded compensation for most of Bechtel's claims, for a total award of $94.7
million plus all of Bechtel's legal and arbitration costs and pre and post-award
1
interest. 04
V.

REVIEW OF THE ICC ARBITRATION FROM A

TWAIL PERSPECTIVE

The TWAIL approach is employed in this section to elaborate three points
about the ICC Arbitration. First, the tribunal appeared to approach its role, not as
that of a commercial arbitration tribunal acting under the contract that authorized
its establishment by the parties to the contract, but as a body enforcing a broader
review mechanism for policy choices of the MSEB and the Maharashtra
98Id. at 25-30.
99 Id. at 30-31.
to()Id.
l Id. at 31.
102
1o3
104

Id.
Id.
Id. at 32-39.
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Government. Second, aspects of the ICC Arbitration, relating to the structure and
process of the arbitration as well as the content of the tribunal's award, offer
reasons to support perceptions of regime bias in international arbitration. Third,
the ICC Arbitration occurred in the context of a broader conflict between Western
and Third World interests.
A.

The Tribunal's Review of Third World Interests

The first point about the ICC Arbitration arises from the tribunal's approach
to its authority and to the purposes of the arbitration. In effect, the tribunal treated
the arbitration - which originated in a Shareholders Agreement between owners of
the DPC - as a venue in which to review far-reaching policy decisions of the
Maharashtra Government. This indicated how an investment arbitration tribunal
may interpret its authority expansively in order to facilitate review of regulatory
choices and judicial decisions of domestic actors. It also indicated how
international arbitration may be used to discipline constituencies in the Third
World where the concerns of such constituencies are taken up by an elected
government.
The tribunal did not limit its authority to the immediate dispute between the
parties to the Shareholders Agreement based on the terms of that contract.
Instead, the tribunal invoked the concept of an "affiliate" 15 as a basis to conclude
that the Indian party to the contract, the MPDC, "was [the Maharashtra
government] and MSEB operating in the DPC corporate structure".os This
conclusion was reached without mention of any legal doctrine to justify subjecting
these non-contracting parties to the tribunal's authority. Its apparent effect was to
lift the corporate veil of the MPDC in order to expose the Maharashtra
Government treasury to liability. Whether it was appropriate for the tribunal to do
this in the circumstances is not the critical point here; the point is that this was an
approach to the separate legal personality of the company which, as a matter of
law, called for reasons to justify it."' More broadly, by adopting this flexible
approach to the corporate personality of the MPDC, the tribunal assumed a review
function that went well beyond the role of a typical commercial arbitration tribunal
resolving an autonomous dispute between parties to the relevant contract.

u Id. at 5,18 & 25.
17.
107 Hanson, O'Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 70, at 3. As an aside, the principle of
separate corporate personality was integral to activities of Enron, Bechtel, and General
Electric in the Dabhol case. For example, it presumably would have enabled the parent
firms to structure their interests, via companies in Mauritius and elsewhere, in a manner
that provided tax benefits, an investment platform, and access to bilateral investment treaty
arbitration against India.
1u6 Id. at
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In addition, the tribunal expanded its remit by taking an expansive approach to
the sources of law that it could apply. 118 The tribunal assumed the authority to
review compliance of the Indian parties not only with the Shareholders Agreement,
based on Bechtel's claims, but also with other contracts and other sources of
law.109 First, the tribunal assumed the authority to interpret and apply the Power
Purchase Agreement between the DPC and the MSEB, neither of which were
parties to the Shareholders Agreement. Notably, the Power Purchase Agreement
was subject to UNCITRAL arbitration in London, not ICC arbitration in New
York."" Second, the tribunal assumed the authority to rule on the Maharashtra
Government's guarantee of the DPC's obligations under the Power Purchase
Agreement."' Third, the tribunal likewise assumed the authority to rule on a State
Support Agreement between the DPC and the Maharashtra Government. 112
Fourth, the tribunal decided to apply New York law, which it cited as the
governing law of the Shareholders Agreement, without outlining a contractual
provision to this effect."
Fifth, the tribunal assumed authority over "the
applicable body of international law" without identifying a specific provision of the
Shareholders Agreement that authorized it to apply international law."14
By these steps, the ICC tribunal assumed a broad supervisory role over policy
decisions of Indian governmental actors against a wide range of legal obligations.
The policy decisions, relating to the cancellation or renegotiation of the Dabhol
project, were supported by diverse constituencies in Maharashtra and elsewhere in
India. By assuming a broad authority to review Indian government actors,
therefore, the tribunal positioned itself to discipline wider groupings of Third
World interests that opposed the project.
B.

The Make-Up of the Tribunal as an Apparent Example of Regime Bias

A second point about the ICC Arbitration is that it is open to criticism based
on the concept of regime bias in international decision-making. As outlined by
Gathii, the regime bias approach in TWAIL "traces the particular manner in which
1os See ICC Arbitration, supranote 2, at 30-31.
119Bechtel's claims in the arbitration, as reported by the tribunal in its award, were

limited to the Shareholders Agreement. Id. at 8-9.
110 Supra note 55.

" ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 21-22 & 31.
Id. at 22 & 31.
"13 Id. at 18.
114 This source is also described by the tribunal as "the applicable standards of
international law requiring recognition of written agreements to submit to international
arbitration and forbidding uncompensated expropriation of Claimant's property", ICC
Arbitration, supra note 2, at 31. Again, no specific source of international law is identified
by the tribunal.
112
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market rules and norms have been applied or interpreted where the stakes involve
an interest of a Third World country in the global economy".115 It also refers to
"the choices made between alternative ways of crafting legal rules, the meanings
ascribed to a particular rule in its application by an administrative agency or at the
adjudication stage by a domestic judicial body or an international tribunal".11 6
Aspects of the ICC Arbitration highlighted in this section and the next offer
support for the premise that regime bias existed against constituencies in India that
opposed the project.11 The discussion is not intended to inquire into or suggest
actual bias in the arbitration, but rather to indicate how aspects of the arbitration
provided a reasonable basis for concern about regime bias." 8
Several aspects of the structure and process of the ICC Arbitration raise
concerns about possible regime bias. One is with respect to the constitution of the
tribunal. The DPC Shareholders Agreement provided, in the absence of an
appointment by the Indian parties of their arbitrator on the tribunal, for the
arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.1 1 9 On this basis, once Bechtel appointed James H.
Carter, a U.S. commercial lawyer as its arbitrator, 12 01a U.S. court then decided to
appoint another U.S. commercial lawyer, Jonathan Rosner, as the Indian parties'
arbitrator. 121 Carter and Rosner then appointed as the presiding arbitrator Louis A.
Craco, also a U.S. commercial lawyer.122 Craco was approved by the ICC as the
presiding member of the tribunal, thus constituting the tribunal of three U.S.
115 See Gathii, supra note 4, at 261.

Id. at 262.
The Indian constituencies that opposed the Dabhol project were subject indirectly
to the ICC Arbitration as a result of the tribunal's review of decisions of the MSEB and the
Maharashtra government.
I" On the distinction between actual and perceived bias, see Gus Van Harten, Investment
Treaty Arbitration, ProceduralFairness,and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
L\w AND COMiPARATIv
B
PUBIC L \w, Ch. 20 (Stephan W. Schill ed., Oxford University
Press 2010).
11 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 6.
12) Id. at 10; Carter is a partner with the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf in New York, with
listed practice areas including international arbitration, antitrust, litigation, project finance
and
infrastructure,
and
intellectual
property,
available
at:
http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/en/People/C/JamesHCarter.aspx (last visited July 15,
2011).
121 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 12; Rosner passed away in 2008 after a long career
as a commercial lawyer and litigator in New York. ObituaryJonathan L. Rosner, ALI LEGA,
INTHLF IIGFNCF, (January 15, 2008).
122 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 12; Craco is a partner with the New York-based
law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher, with listed practice areas including general business
litigation, arbitration, commercial and corporate law disputes, and other areas, available at:
http://www.thecca.net/bio.aspx?id=12 (last visited Julyl5, 2011).
116
117
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P'ma fade, this make-up of the tribunal does not give the

impression of a neutral and impartial forum for the resolution of a dispute between
a U.S. firm and Third World interests in India.12 4 Both the nationality and
professional background of the arbitrators suggest a far greater affinity with U.S.
corporate interests than with the Indian constituencies that opposed the Dabhol
project.
Additionally, regarding the structure and process, the place and legal seat of
the ICC Arbitration, as designated in the Shareholders Agreement, was New
York. 125 This meant that any application to set aside the award based on the New
York Convention would be decided in New York courts.1 26 Further, the arbitration
was conducted under the ICC's Arbitration Rules, which give supervisory authority
over various aspects of the arbitration to the ICC International "Court" of
Arbitration. 12 7 It is very likely that Enron and other U.S. firms involved in the
Dabhol project were members of the ICC or its National Committee in the U.S. the U.S. Council for International Business - at the time of the ICC Arbitration. 128
Further, it is reasonable to assume that the ICC, "[tjhe world business
organization", 129 would be more attuned to the interests of major firms than those
123

ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 12.

124 For criticism of the role of Indian courts in the Dabhol case, outlined by a former

U.S. government official, see Bettauer,supra note 5.
125 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 7.
126 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New
York, 10 June, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. V (hereinafter New York Convention).
127 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 7. The scare quotes are included only because the
ICC International Court of Arbitration is a business entity that is not characterized by
safeguards of judicial independence that apply to domestic and international courts. Yves
Dezalay and Bryant Garth described the ICC Court of Arbitration as "an oversight
committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions [and that] appears to be
particularly sensitive to the business clientele...", YvF's DHZAiY\
& BRYAN GAR'il,
DFAiING IN ViR'Lust-: INTE RNT
\I ON, \
COMMiRc li, ARBiITRATION
AND Timii
tF45 (University of Chicago Press
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANsNATIONAL LFGAL OR
1996) (hereinafter DF/\l\Y & G\RI i).
128
See
International
Chamber

of
Commerce,
available
at
http://www.iccwbo.org/idl9696/index.html (last visited July 15, 2011) ("ICC membership
groups thousands of companies of every size in over 130 countries worldwide. They
represent a broad cross-section of business activity including manufacturing, trade, services
and the professions. Through membership of ICC, companies shape rules and policies that
stimulate international trade and investment. These companies in turn count on the
prestige and expertise of ICC to get business views across to governments and
intergovernmental organizations, whose decisions affect corporate finances and operations
worldwide.").
129 See International Chamber of Commerce, available at: http://www.iccwbo.org/ (last
visited JulT 15, 2011).
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of the constituencies in India that opposed the project.130
These institutional aspects of the ICC Arbitration give reason to suspect that
the tribunal would reflect a predisposition against the Indian parties due to the
make-up of the tribunal, the location of the arbitration, and the supervisory role of
the ICC. The structure of the decision-making process was established by an
agreement amongst the owners of the DPC, including the MPDC, and can be
characterized simply as part of a consensual agreement underlying the contract,
including on the issue of whether the dispute settlement process was open to any
apparent bias. From the perspective of regime bias, however, this would only trace
the basis for suspicion of bias to another part of the story of the Dabhol project that is, to the point at which the Shareholders Agreement was concluded and then
extended to the MPDC. It would also entail an acceptance that the dispute
settlement arrangements in that contract - and perhaps many other investment
contracts - are designed and understood to favour the Western parties at the
expense of Third World interests. The discussion here, drawing on the regime bias
approach, seeks to examine the claim that international adjudication provides a fair
and independent method to interpret international rules. Having peeled away the
institutional layers, it seems that the ICC Arbitration does offer a basis at least on
which to suspect "bias... traced in the way in which rules of international...
investment are crafted, applied and adjudicated... between Third World countries
and the interests of international capital".' 3 '
C. The Content of the Tribunal'sAward as an Apparent Example of Regime Bias
These institutional reasons to suspect regime bias are supported by an analysis
of the content of the tribunal's award. On nearly every issue, the tribunal decided
in favour of Bechtel and against the Indian parties. In particular, with the
exception of one aspect of its decision on damages, the tribunal favoured Bechtel
in its historical account of the project and on its arguments for all issues of
jurisdiction, merits, and remedy. Moreover, in most instances, there was little or no
explanation for why the tribunal decided against the Indian parties in the way that
it did. These aspects of the award are reviewed in this section.
The first aspect involves the tribunal's characterization of the history of the
30 It is acknowledged that the ICC Court of Arbitration is a semi-autonomous entity
within the ICC, but the ICC Court is nonetheless not institutionally independent in the
manner of state-based domestic and international courts. Incidentally, in 2008, the ICC
Court's chair (Pierre Tercier) resigned, reportedly because of objections that the body was
not sufficiently independent of the ICC Secretariat; N. Goswami, ICC kft reeling as arbitration
court chairman Terder reszns, THE LAWYTR (March 31, 2008); See also DEZ-ALAY & GARTH,

supra note 127.
131 Gathii,

supra note 4, at 261-262.
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project. This characterization was highly favourable to the role of the U.S. firms
and placed the blame for the project's failure almost completely on Indian actors.
Above all, the tribunal attributed the breakdown of the project to regulatory
failings of the MSEB and to the political parties that won the Maharashtra
elections in 1995 and 1999. According to the tribunal:
In the elections of 1995, two major opposition parties..., both
dedicated to a wide range of measures to rid [Maharashtra] of
"alien" influences, came to power. In the course of their campaigns
they had stirred up substantial popular opposition to the Project.
When the two parties formed a coalition government, they set
about reversing years of encouragement given to the Project by
their predecessors...

These additional financial obligations [arising from obligations to
purchase power from the project in 1999-2000] loomed at a time
when MSEB was suffering the consequences of years of politically
popular but fiscally unsound energy policies. For years there had
been a program of politically motivated subsidies to selected classes
of power consumers, together with handouts and favors to large
power-consuming constituencies. MSEB had also failed to check
rampant theft of electricity from the grid and unmetered service,
both of which obviously depleted MSEB's revenue stream. By
2000, MSEB itself admitted that more than half of the electricity it
purchased and distributed was "lost" to these abuses.
At the same time, state election campaigns in 1999 re-ignited the
clamor against the Project that had led to the 1995 repudiation. A
coalition of parties with expressed hostility to the Project formed a
132
government....
It is not suggested here that this version of the project's history is positively
and entirely inaccurate. Indian sources also identify benefits of the Dahbol project
as well as problems with India's energy sector.133 However, in the award, there is
ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 2, 22-23 & 26. Incidentally, Bechtel's claims,
outlined in the ICC Arbitration award, framed the dispute as arising from "a dramatic
reversal" of the energy policy of Maharashtra, "all as a result of political change in its
government".
133 Parikh, supra note 30 at 1468-9; Sebastian Morris, PoliticalEconomy of Eletric Power in
India, 31(21) ECON. & POL. WNKLY. 1274 (May 25, 1996).
132
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no substantiation or serious analysis of the historical background that would justify
the tribunal's version of events. Indeed, the tribunal cites no witness testimony or
outside authority at all. The award also appears to contain factual errors. For
example, regarding the renegotiation of the project in 1995, the tribunal found that
an interim award issued in the UNCITRAL arbitration in London "forced [the
Maharashtra Government] to retreat from its repudiation of the Project and to
begin renegotiation of the Project Agreements". 13 4 No evidentiary basis is provided
for this finding and other sources report that the government's decision to
renegotiate, rather than cancel, the project was taken in the fall of 1995, several
months before the reported UNCITRAL award.135
In contrast to this portrayal of the Indian parties, the tribunal portrayed the
Dabhol project itself in a very generous light:
[The Project] was intended to help remedy the acute shortfall in
power already experienced in India and well documented
internationally; it was also meant to furnish power to meet the
increasing requirements of the planned major economic growth of
the nation. These present and anticipated power shortfalls
represented a pent-up and prospective demand that provided
reasonable assurance of a market for the power to be produced by
the Project.
At the same time, it was recognized that the public sector was a
crucial player in deciding how, and on what terms, the power
produced by the Project would be distributed among the
consumers that would compete for it. The success of the Project
thus demanded a sustained collaborative effort....
Once it was decided to situate the plants... in Maharashtra it was
to
[the
Maharashtra
government]
and
its
responsible
instrumentalities that the sponsors and DPC... looked for the
necessary assurances. Those assurances came in the form of the
"Project Agreements" which ultimately lie at the heart of this case.
Those agreements were a Power Purchase Agreement... between
MSEB and DPC, [a Maharashtra government] Guarantee in favor
of DPC, and the State Support Agreement... executed by [the
Maharashtra government]. Separately and in combination they
134 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 23. This reported UNCITRAL award could not
itself be reviewed because it was not publicly available.
15 See Kundra, supra note 30, at 917-918; Parikh, supra note 30, at 1463; Salacuse, supra
note 32, at 1352-1353.
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defined a series of relationships and reciprocal obligations that
were intended to codify the private-public collaboration on which
the Project fundamentally rested, and to establish the agreed
methods by which financial feasibility and adequate cash flows
could be created and sustained.... 136
Thus, the project was characterized as addressing energy needs in India and
supporting economic growth. These factors gave "reasonable assurance of a
market for the power to be produced" so long as "the necessary assurances" were
given by Indian government actors." The tribunal did not mention any of the
questionable aspects of the deal, such as the MSEB's duty to buy power at a high
tariff, the unlikelihood that the MSEB would be able to meet its obligations, or the
World Bank's refusal to finance the project. Compare the tribunal's findings above
to this conclusion reached by Godbole after a review of the project:
It is... an eloquent commentary on how the Indian and foreign
financial institutions, with all the expertise at their disposal, had
failed to make an in-depth scrutiny of the project to establish its
financial and economic viability before agreeing to finance it.
Clearly, they had preferred to rely on the state government
guarantee, counter-guarantee by [Government of India] and
guarantees and insurance cover provided by export credit
institutions....131
Most importantly, the tribunal did not appear aware of, or chose not to report,
information that would contribute to a more careful and balanced assessment of
the responsibility of the various parties to the Dabhol deal. There was no mention
of the one-sided terms of the Power Purchase Agreement, the inability of all of the
parties to renegotiate on a sustainable basis, or the alleged corruption behind the
deal. The tribunal also neglected to mention any of the concerns of Indian
constituencies about the project's impact on consumer rights, local fishing and
farming, community access to land and water, and environmental protection, for
example. Instead, the tribunal blamed political parties for stirring up opposition to
the project in the 1995 election in Maharashtra and re-igniting opposition in the
1999 election.139 This discounted the possibility that voters in India might have
their own rational and coherent grounds for opposing the Dabhol project.

136

ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 20.

137 Id. at 20.
138

Godbole, supra note 64, at 2331.

139 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 22-23, 26.
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Information on these and other problems with the project was readily available
when the tribunal's proceedings began in 2004.14() Such information was open to
consideration when the tribunal reported that it "subjected the submissions of
EEMC [the Claimant and a Bechtel subsidiary] to a degree of heightened scrutiny
that was required... because of the failure of the Respondents to appear and
controvert them". 141 However, the tribunal framed its award based on a rendition
of the historical background that heavily favoured the role and contribution of U.S.
investors while denigrating regulators and electoral processes in India.
The second aspect of the award that favoured Bechtel related to the tribunal's
discussion on issues of jurisdiction, whereby the tribunal expanded dramatically the
scope of the arbitration. For one, the tribunal allowed claims by Bechtel against the
MSEB and the Maharashtra Government even though these actors were not
parties to the Shareholders Agreement. Further, the tribunal incorporated various
sources of law that went beyond the terms of the Shareholders Agreement as
reproduced in the award. On this basis, the tribunal assumed the authority to
review and adjudge policy decisions associated with a wide range of constituencies
that opposed the project. It also permitted Bechtel to make its claims and recover
damages against Indian government actors. 142 And, once again, the tribunal
provided limited reasoning to justify its decisions. For example, the tribunal found
that it could interpret the conduct of the Indian parties under "the applicable body
of international law includ[ing] the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as well as certain
international agreements to which India is a party creating a legal framework within
which private investment in that country could be made". 143
However, the tribunal offered no legal reasoning to support the conclusion
that sources of international law were applicable to a dispute under the
Shareholders Agreement. The tribunal likewise did not mention a single example
among the "certain international agreements" to which it referred, let alone analyze
any treaty text.144 If the tribunal was referring to bilateral investment treaties
concluded by India, then the effect of its decision was to incorporate dozens of
treaties into a contract without identifying any provision of the Shareholders
Agreement authorizing the tribunal to do so.
The third aspect of the award was the decision on the merits of the dispute.
Here, the tribunal ruled against the Indian parties on an astonishingly wide range
140 Infra note 156.
141 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 1.
142 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 17.
143 Id at 18.
144 Id.
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of grounds. It concluded that the conduct of the Indian parties breached the
Shareholders Agreement and other agreements, that it breached New York law,
and that it amounted to an expropriation under international law.145 Little or no
analysis was provided to support these conclusions. On the issue of expropriation,
for example, the question of whether a state entity's breach of contract can amount
to expropriation is complex and not settled in international law. Yet the tribunal
simply stated its conclusion on this issue without referring to any specific source or
provision of law on expropriation or employing any legal reasoning. 146 The
tribunal's complete discussion of the issue of expropriation was as follows:
"Eighth, the coordinated course of conduct, including the several breaches found
above, operated as a total expropriation of the Claimant's investment in the
Project, and resulted in depriving Claimant of its fundamental rights in the Project
and the entire benefit of its investment therein". 147
The lack of reasoning here is striking when one considers the breadth of the
authority assumed by the tribunal and the significance of a finding that a
government expropriated assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars. It is
indicative of a general lack of reasoning to support the tribunal's conclusions that
the Indian parties violated substantive provisions in several contracts, New York
law, and international law.
The fourth aspect of the award is the tribunal's decision on the remedy. The
148
tribunal awarded U.S. $94.7 million to Bechtel (60% of the amount claimed),
which included compensation for all of the direct equity contributions reported by
Bechtel as part of its claim but excluded "indirect, incidental, or consequential
damages" which were not covered, according to the tribunal, by the Shareholders

145Id. at 31.

146It is a complex legal question whether and in what circumstances a breach of
contract - absent exhaustion of local remedies by the party claiming a breach of the
contract (based on an exclusive dispute settlement clause in the contract) - could amount
to an expropriation, denial of justice, or other breach of international law. See Kerr &
Whittaker, supra note 67, at 18-19; and Kundra, supra note 30, at 923-930 (concluding after
a careful analysis: "whether the use of host country judicial systems to avoid contractual
obligations constitutes expropriation or a violation of international law is not a settled legal
issue. In most cases, the inquiry will depend on whether the government actions have
constituted a denial of justice."). It is also a complex question, in the event that a breach of
the contract was found, what compensation or other remedy should follow under
international law. For a discussion of the latter question in the context of Indian law, see
Srinivasan, supra note 41, at 1154 (noting that Indian law, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of India, treats electricity as a "material resource of the Indian people" that is
compensable, on expropriation, for its book value rather than its market value).
147ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 31.
148Id. at 34.
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Agreement. 149 The tribunal arrived at the amount awarded without seeking an
independent expert evaluation of the amounts claimed by Bechtel's counsel and
expert.1so Also, the tribunal included a further award of pre and post-award interest
at the rate of 9% simple interest. 151 The tribunal attributed this interest rate to New
York law without mentioning any specific provision in New York law for the rate
or indicating why other rates (such as the LIBOR 152) were not considered. Finally,
the tribunal awarded to Bechtel all of its claimed legal costs, totaling over $2.7
million, and the full arbitration costs of $285,000, with post-award interest at
9%.15 In total, about $3 million in costs - evidently 100% of what Bechtel sought
- was granted. Thus, although the remedial stage of the award did not go
completely in Bechtel's favour, it nonetheless favoured Bechtel heavily based on
the amount of compensation, the full recovery of legal and arbitration costs, and
the chosen interest rate.
Overall, the tribunal decided in favour of Bechtel in its characterization of the
background of the project, its approach to jurisdiction, its decisions on the merits,
and - to a somewhat lesser extent - its decision on the remedy. A wide range of
factual information that was relevant to the dispute, as well as the policy decisions
of the Indian governmental parties, was not mentioned. For example, there was no
mention in the award of:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

The economic imbalance underlying the project, including the allocation of
supply risk, demand risk, and currency risk to the MSEB;
The World Bank's negative review and decision not to finance the project;
The allegations of corruption surrounding the project;
The failures of Enron Corporation that led to its collapse in 2001;
The human rights abuses attributed to Indian authorities and to Enron and the
U.S. government by Human Rights Watch in its report in 2001;
The concerns raised by constituencies in India, including in technical
reviews, 154 about the project;
The role played by activists, non-governmental organizations, and social
movements in drawing attention to the project's problems and the role of this
public opposition in the election of a Maharashtra Government that was
committed to cancelling the project; 155 or

149

Id. at 32-33.

Iso

Id. at 32.

iji Id. at 34 & 38.
152 London Interbank Offered Rate, which is referenced in many international
investment arbitrations.
t53 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 34-36.
154 See, e.g., Sant, Dixit & Wagle, supranote 43.
t55 Human Rights Watch, supra note 30, at Parts I & III; Purkayastha, supra note 40, at
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The findings and conclusions of review processes in India that detailed a host
of problems with the project, typically in much greater detail than the ICC
Arbitration award.

As mentioned earlier, information about these matters was available on public
record at the time of the ICC Arbitration.156 It may be that not all of the
information was directly relevant to the Shareholders Agreement itself. However,
much of it was clearly relevant to the arbitration, especially when one considers the
extent to which the tribunal assumed the authority to review decisions of the
Maharashtra Government and applied a wide variety of sources of law.
The absence of any discussion of this information in the award may be
explained in part by the Indian parties' decision not to participate in the arbitration.
However, the tribunal stated that it accounted for the position of the Indian parties
in the litigation in order to ensure accuracy and fairness. 15 The tribunal reported,
for example, that it "studied Claimant's evidentiary and legal submissions with
special care, and has independently interrogated certain key witnesses about their
written declarations, all to the end of satisfying itself that the result it reaches is
correct and fair...."158 In light of this, the tribunal's failure to refer to any of the
above information suggests that it either did not inform itself of pertinent facts or
did not apply those facts to Bechtel's counsel and witnesses. In either case, the
tribunal did not demonstrate a careful and balanced assessment of the Dabhol
project.
This review of the ICC Arbitration award has highlighted aspects of the
tribunal's decision-making that went against the Indian parties. Remarkably, there
were no significant portions of the award, other than at the damages stage as
discussed above, which went in favour of the Indian parties. As mentioned, the
tribunal provided little or no reasoning to justify its conclusions on many
important issues. Along with the composition of the tribunal, this offers a basis on
which to doubt the tribunal's impartiality and neutrality. The ICC Arbitration is
only one example, of course, and the present review does not address other
proceedings in the Dabhol case or investment arbitration generally. That said, the
award is a notable example of apparent regime bias since ICC awards are generally
2042 ("The people of Maharashtra deserve all credit for this [repudiation of the Dabhol
project in 1995], as it was their continued struggle that kept up the pressure on this ruinous
project.").
116 The tribunal was constituted in late April 2004. Various sources cited in this article,
including reports in Economic and Political Weekly, U.S. law journals, and the Human
Rights Watch report, supranote 30, were available on the public record at the time.
t57 ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 1 & 19.
l5s

Id. at 19.
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confidential and because this is the only award in an investment arbitration against
India which is publicly available. 159 If tis is the public face of investment
arbitration against the Indian state, then there is cause for concern about other
awards that are not subject to public scrutiny.

D. The Wider Conflict between Western and Third World Interests
A third point arising from a TWAIL perspective, which is highlighted briefly
in this section, is that the ICC Arbitration was not a discrete commercial
arbitration of an isolated dispute arising from a specific agreement to arbitrate.
Rather, the arbitration was shaped into an arrangement to govern the regulatory
relationship between major firms and governments in India. It also formed part of,
and interacted with, a wider conflict between Western and Third World interests. 160
In this context, the arbitration relied on the authority of Western courts and
ultimately on the political support of the U.S. government.
The wider conflict in this case involved a confrontation between actors and
institutions in the U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, the U.K.) and India. In the course
of the dispute, the U.S. and Indian parties both sought injunctions from courts in
their respective jurisdictions. The Indian parties obtained injunctions to stay the
London and New York arbitrations, while the U.S. parties sought or obtained
injunctions from Western courts to enjoin the Indian parties from initiating actions
in India and require their submission to arbitration. 161 The object of these actions
was apparently to obstruct proceedings in the other side's venue. This reflected a
contest of domestic judicial authorities and of different sources of law, especially in
the case of contractual provisions that were concluded in India but that provided
for arbitration in the U.S. or the U.K. Based on these provisions, the ICC
Arbitration could proceed only after a U.S. court intervened in the process by
appointing the Indian parties' arbitrator. 162
1s9 This reflects the ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 87, art. 6, Appendix I
(Statutes of the International Court of Arbitration) ("The work of the Court is of a
confidential nature which must be respected by everyone who participates in that work in
whatever capacity. The Court lays down the rules regarding the persons who can attend the
meetings of the Court and its Committees and who are entitled to have access to the
materials submitted to the Court and its Secretariat.").
160 It is not suggested here that there is a clear definition of or distinction between
Western and Third World interests. These categories are fluid and contested in the TWAIL
literature itself However, it is suggested in the Dabhol case that the role of major U.S.
firms, relevant agencies of the U.S. government, and courts and tribunals in the U.S. and
U.K. fit comfortably within the TWAIL concept of Western interests; and that the interests
of the various constituencies in India that opposed the project, and the -Maharashtra
government and MSEB after 1995, fit within the concept of Third World interests.
161 See ICC Arbitration, supra note 2, at 11 & 27-28.
162 Id. at 10-12.
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The phenomenon of competing and overlapping litigation is not uncommon
in major trade and investment disputes. 163 It reflects how arbitrations may entangle
domestic courts in different jurisdictions and how the ability of any court to affect
the results of a dispute may depend on the court's degree of control over persons
or assets in its jurisdiction and, ultimately, on the support of its government.
Judgments of domestic courts or international tribunals will have competing claims
to legitimacy based not only on their perceived fairness, independence, and
competence, but also on the economic and political clout behind a decision or
award. At the level of inter-state conflict, then, adjudicative proceedings may
warrant further study from TWAIL and other writers. For example, to what extent
do investment contracts and treaties establish a regime in which policy decisions
on behalf of Third World interests are subject to review by foreign courts? To
what extent do different adjudicative decision-makers provide a balanced forum in
which to make such decisions? To what extent do they reflect a colonial or postcolonial relationship between the West and the Third World? 16 4

VI. CONCLUSION
The TWAIL perspective provided a framework for review of the Dabhol ICC
Arbitration. This framework was based on propositions in TWAIL which asserted
that international law reflects power relations between Western and Third World
interests and is a product of colonialism, that international adjudication may reflect
a regime bias against the Third World, and that an important aim of international
legal scholarship is to go beyond criticism and attempt to elaborate options for
reform.
In the review of the ICC Arbitration, three points were outlined. The first
involved the role of the arbitration as a mechanism to review decisions associated
with Third World interests. It was argued that the ICC Arbitration was taken
beyond the scope of a classical commercial arbitration, pursuant to a discrete
contractual relationship, and constituted as a type of governing arrangement. This
followed the tribunal's decisions to expand the arbitration beyond the parties to
the relevant contract and apply a variety of legal sources besides that contract. By
these decisions, the tribunal was able to issue an award against Indian
governmental actors on the reasoning that their conduct - especially the decision

Peter Drahos, Weaving Webs of Influence: The United States, Free Trade Agreements and
Dispute Resolution, 41(1) J. Woiu D Tinmb 191 (2007); Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions,
Forum Shopping and Dispute Settlement in InternationalTrade, 61 IT1'1 ORG. 735 (2007); Shawn
Moen, Regulation By ProceduralEntanglement: The Canadian Wheat Board and InternationalTrade
Law, (2010) (LL.M. Major Research Paper, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University).
164 Anghie, supranote 15.
163
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to cancel the Dabhol project - breached several agreements related to the project
as well as domestic and international law.
The second point was that the ICC Arbitration offers reasons to suspect
regime bias in international arbitration. The structure and process of the
arbitration, on its face, did not indicate an impeccably neutral and impartial forum.
Further, the content of the award weighed heavily in favour of Bechtel and
demonstrated little or no reasoning to justify important conclusions. The award
also did not mention highly problematic aspects of the Dabhol project. Notably,
the analysis on this point did not address the issue of actual bias on the part of the
tribunal; rather, it conveyed how aspects of the arbitration support suspicions of
regime bias in international adjudication.
The third point involved the wider conflict between Western and Third World
interests. The Dabhol case demonstrated how an array of adjudicative proceedings
was triggered in a conflict involving major firms as well as governments in the U.S.
and India. In the ICC Arbitration, Western interests including Enron, Bechtel, the
International Chamber of Commerce, New York courts, and U.S. governmental
agencies were implicated. Likewise, various constituencies in India that opposed
the project and which reflected Third World interests came to be represented by
the actions of Indian governmental actors and Indian courts. The wider dispute
was resolved only by an overall settlement between U.S. firms, and the U.S. and
Indian governments, which presumably led to the payment of a substantial sum by
5
India.16
This study of the ICC Arbitration indicates that the TWAIL perspective
provides a useful framework for the critique of international arbitration. It was
illustrated, based on TWAIL, that investment contract arbitration may be used to
discipline governments which respond to Third World interests. 16 6 Arbitrations
were initiated in the Dabhol case only after such interests were taken up by
governmental actors. This highlights the critical role of the state in mediating
relations and resolving conflicts between foreign investors and Third World
interests. However, one may ask whether the ramifications of investment
arbitration for democratic choice and regulatory flexibility in the Third World may
also apply to governments and constituencies in the West. If so, what would this
mean for the distinction in TWAIL between Western and Third World interests?
On the other hand, 'TWAIL appeared to offer less in terms of alternatives to
existing models of international decision-making, including investment arbitration.
165 The research for this article did not examine how this ultimate outcome of the
dispute affected the interests of various actors in the U.S. and India.
166 See Falk, Stevens & Rajagopal, supranote 9, at 4.
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At a general level, the TWAIL literature calls for alternatives; for example, in
elaborating the regime bias approach, Gathii states:
... developing countries should consistently contest outcomes
adverse to them, with alternatives that serve their best interests,
rather than merely focusing on bias as the inevitable outcome of
the origin of the rules in industrial economies or to the lopsided
nature of the bargaining power of Third World states relative to
developed countries or multinational capital. 16
The next question, though, is how to develop strategies for states - or the
Indian government actors in the Dabhol case - that would allow them to "contest
outcomes... with alternatives that serve their best interests". Should the Indian
parties have participated in the ICC Arbitration? Should they have refused to settle
the dispute? Should they have declined to consent to ICC arbitration clauses in the
investment contracts? Should they reject investor-state arbitration in investment
treaties? Or might it be in the interests of India to maintain a role for some forms
of arbitration where the terms of a particular contract or treaty are thought to
outweigh the costs and risks?
These are not straightforward questions for governments, let alone for
scholars operating primarily at a normative level. Yet, given the calls for
alternatives, one might expect more detailed guidance in TWAIL about whether or
not particular avenues for reform would be consistent with Third World interests.
For example, how might investment be encouraged, managed, or regulated toward
social ends? Should international adjudication be rejected or reformed? Does the
TWAIL approach support particular changes to investment contracts or treaties?
Along these lines, a modest and very tentative suggestion is to attempt to
incorporate inter-disciplinary study of applied and technical topics, such as (in the
present case) energy sector regulation or development economics. The strength of
the TWAIL approach lies in its normative ambition and diversity. A corresponding
weakness may be its difficulty to focus intensively on discrete priorities for reform.
Thus, the TWAIL perspective draws attention to important flaws in international
institutions and prompts reflection about alternatives, but appears to risk leaving
the discussion of specific strategies to other fields of law and policy.

167 Gathii,

supra note 4, at 262.

